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CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: MUSIC
PIRATES DON'T SING THE "JAILHOUSE
ROCK" WHEN THEY STEAL FROM
THE KING
THE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY BEHIND COPYRIGHT LAW
Back in the days of Homer, music was freely exchanged. No musi-
cian sold his songs to pay his keep and no musician paid royalties to
perform songs not his own. Musicians memorized each other's songs
and performed them at community gatherings. Those entertained at the
community gatherings provided food and shelter to the musicians in or-
der to have the joy of their music. Because the community provided for
the musician's needs, the musicians shared their music with each other
and the community.'
Today society provides musicians with economic rights in the form
of copyright protection, rather than providing them with food and shel-
ter. Specifically, the United States copyright law provides exclusive
rights to those who create original works of authorship and fix them in
any tangible medium of expression from which they can be perceived.2
A copyright holder has the exclusive right, among other things, to
reproduce the work, to distribute the work by sale or lease, and to per-
form it.3 The purpose of United States copyright law is to promote crea-
tivity by giving economic gain to the original author.4 Because of the
1. See generally, Cecil M. Bowra, Homer, OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 524, 525 9
(1970). Bowra offers evidence that Homer owed a great deal to the other musical poets of his
tradition. For example, the episodic method of Homer's narrative, full of different dialects and
archaisms, indicated that it was the product of an oral tradition many years in the making.
Homer also composed in groups of words or formulae that he took from other poets. Further,
his plots show hints of earlier treatments which were not his. Id. According to Bowra, "it
seems certain that [Homer] used [earlier versions of the Odyssey and Iliad] and improved on
them." Id.
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 1970).
3. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1970).
4. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In Mazer v. Stein, the United States
Supreme Court declared that "the economic philosophy" behind the power of Congress to
grant copyrights is "conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors .. " 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954). The Mazer Court did note that promotion of art for the public welfare was
the primary consideration and reward to the author was a secondary consideration. Id. (citing
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)). Yet the Mazer Court made
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economic rights the law provides, musicians no longer simply give their
music to each other and society. Today musicians are copyright holders
who license their work for money. Music is a good which is bought and
sold in the marketplace.
When someone exercises one of the exclusive rights to a musical
work without a license from the copyright holder, that someone is usu-
ally an infringer.' An infringer can be enjoined6 and can be held liable
for damages and profits. 7 Where the infringement is willful and "for pur-
poses of commercial advantage or private financial gain," the infringer
also can be subject to criminal fines and imprisonment under the criminal
copyright provisions codified at section 506 of Title 17 and section 2319
of Title 18 of the United States Code.' Although the same muse speaks
to musicians today as in Homer's time, society has developed a different
way of supporting and defending musicians through both civil and crimi-
nal copyright law.
THE UNFORTUNATE DECISION IN DOWLING V. UNITED STATES
Unfortunately for both musicians and audiences, the United States
Supreme Court in Dowling v. United States ("Dowling")9 ignored the eco-
nomic philosophy underlying United States copyright law. In Dowling,
the question before the Court was whether general federal criminal stat-
utes, such as the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"), which pro-
vides penalties for transportation of stolen goods across state lines under
clear that the copyright laws are "intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to
authors" in order "to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or artistic]
works." Id. (citing Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
5. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West 1970). Someone who exercises one of the exclusive rights
without a license is only "usually" an infringer as there are limitations on the exclusive rights.
See note 47 where the fair use limitation on exclusive rights is explained.
6. 17 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1970). Infringing articles may also be impounded and de-
stroyed. 17 U.S.C.A. § 503 (West 1970).
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West 1970).
8. The criminal penalties for willful infringement, formerly found only in § 506 of the
copyright title, Title 17, were revised with the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of
1982. Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 (1982). Section 506, as amended, provides: "Any person
who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain shall be punished as provided in section 2319 of title 18." 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West
Supp. 1986). Section 2319 provides graded criminal penalties for copyright infringement, de-
pending on the number of works which are reproduced or distributed within a 180-day time
period. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319 (West Supp. 1986).
There are also criminal copyright provisions in state law. For example, misappropriation
of recorded music for commercial advantage or private financial gain is a public offense in
California. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West 1987).
9. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
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its section 2314,10 apply in cases of criminal copyright infringement. In
other words, the Court had to decide whether copyright infringing
materials are stolen goods under NSPA section 2314. The majority held
that copyright infringing materials are not "goods, wares or merchan-
dise" that can be "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" for purposes of
NSPA section 2314. Thus, under Dowling, a defendant may be sued for
civil damages and prosecuted for criminal copyright infringement, and
yet not be prosecuted for interstate transportation of stolen property
under NSPA section 2314, even though the defendant knowingly trans-
ported criminal copyright infringing materials across state lines.
After Dowling, criminal copyright infringers still have the economic
incentive to conduct nationwide distribution. Musicians, however, are
left without effective protection from interstate criminal copyright in-
fringement, which puts a large drain on the economic resources that soci-
ety has provided. According to the Dowling dissent, the difficulty the
majority had in applying the interstate transportation of stolen goods
statute to copyright infringement had "more to do with [the majority's
view] on the relative evil of copyright infringement versus other kinds of
thievery, than it does with interpretation of the statutory language."''
As to relative evil, the Dowling majority obviously thought it more evil to
steal a car than to steal a song. 2 The Dowling majority based its reason-
10. Id. Section 2314 provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchan-
dise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have
been stolen, converted or taken by fraud... [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (West 1970).
11. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 229 (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. The legislative history of the NSPA does seem to indicate that Congress intended the
NSPA to apply to car theft and the like and not federal copyright infringement. The majority,
in its analysis of the legislative history of the NSPA, noted that § 2314 was an extension of the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act ("NMVTA"), Pub. L. No. 70, 41 Stat. 324 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 2312 (West 1970)). Dowling, 473 U.S. at 218-20. The original intent of both inter-
state theft statutes, NMVTA and NSPA, enacted under the power of the Commerce Clause,
was to strike down the state lines which hampered state law enforcement. Id. at 220. The
Dowling majority commented that there was a need for supplemental federal action regarding
state criminal law, while no such need exists regarding interstate acts of copyright infringe-
ment: copyright law is federal law enacted under the Copyright Clause and so not subject to
the same evasion of enforcement problems as state criminal law. Id. See note 17 and accom-
panying text regarding Dowling's evasion of enforcement.
Congress could directly penalize interstate distribution of copyright infringing goods
under the Copyright Clause, which it has not done. Congress, however, has made its criminal
copyright penalties "in addition to any other law." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319 (West Supp. 1986).
See note 29 and accompanying text. That Congress has not specifically provided penalties for
interstate acts of infringement could indicate an intent that there should be no such penalties,
but the express criminal copyright penalties are clearly not exclusive. See United States v.
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ing on the fact that cars are tangible, while songs (as opposed to pho-
norecords) are intangible.
THE FACTS: SELLING ELVIS WITHOUT A LICENSE AND WITHOUT
PAYING COPYRIGHT ROYALTIES
In 1976, defendant Dowling, in conjunction with codefendants
Theaker and Minor, 13 began to manufacture and distribute phonorecords
of unreleased Elvis Presley recordings. Dowling and his associates never
obtained a license from, nor paid royalties to, the owners of the Presley
copyrights ("Elvis copyright holders").1 4 Dowling, living in Baltimore,
selected and obtained the musical material, and created the record jack-
ets. Theaker, in Los Angeles, took care of arranging for manufacture of
the Presley phonorecords, distributing the catalogs and filling the orders.
Minor, working out of Miami, also arranged for manufacture and ran his
own resale business.
15
Dowling and his codefendants obtained the Presley recordings from
a variety of sources, including studio outtakes and tapes of Presley con-
certs and television appearances. Initially, they had the records manu-
factured at a record pressing company in Burbank, California. Later,
when that company refused to take their orders, they sought out other
record pressing companies in Los Angeles and Miami. 16
When Dowling and Theaker began to suspect that the local FBI was
investigating the Los Angeles operation, they started shipping large
quantities of the phonorecords from Los Angeles to Maryland by way of
a commercial trucking company.1 7 In their revised operations, Theaker
collected the orders in California and sent them to Dowling in Maryland,
who would then fill the orders. In addition to the Los Angeles to Mary-
Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1984). See note 29 regarding the "any other
law" provision. Considerations of state law enforcement problems and the untapped powers of
the federal Congress do not necessarily indicate that the economic rights granted under the
Copyright Clause are not protected by the interstate theft provisions of section 2314. Does the
owner of a stolen car suffer a qualitatively different economic loss than the owner of an in-
fringed song? Is it more of a public offense to take stolen cars across state lines than pirated
phonorecords? Are copyright infringing materials stolen goods?
13. United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1985), is the decision in the case against
Dowling's codefendant Minor.
14. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 211. RCA Records has the exclusive right to manufacture and
distribute Elvis Presley sound recordings produced after July 26, 1954. The Presley estate,
through RCA, has the right to receive royalites on all Presley recordings made after March 1,
1973. Dowling v. U.S., 739 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
15. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 211-12.
16. Id.
17. See supra note 12 regarding evasion of enforcement.
[Vol. 7
CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
land shipments, the men made large shipments from Los Angeles to
Miami, where Minor had his own resale business.1 8
Theirs was a "massive" operation. 9 Dowling and Theaker hired an
addressing and mailing service that mailed out over 50,000 catalogs. At
the trial, post office employees testified that Dowling mailed "hundreds
of packages" containing phonorecords each week. Dowling was spend-
ing at least $1,000 per week on postage alone.20
Dowling was charged with one count of conspiracy to transport sto-
len property interstate in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371, seven counts
of interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 2314, fourteen counts of criminal copyright infringement in viola-
tion of 17 U.S.C. section 506(a) and three counts of mail fraud in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. section 3141. After the trial court found Dowling
guilty of all counts against him, he appealed all but the criminal copy-
right counts.2 '
THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION: THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT
OWNERS ARE JUST AS DESERVING OF PROTECTION UNDER
THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT AS THE
RIGHTS OF OWNERS OF OTHER TYPES
OF PROPERTY
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Dowling's convictions.2 2 In so doing,
the court relied on its earlier decision in United States v. Belmont ("Bel-
mont").23 Before the Ninth Circuit, Dowling made two arguments. The
first argument was in defense to the mail fraud count and the second in
defense to the NSPA section 2314 interstate transportation count. Re-
garding mail fraud, Dowling argued that the government was limited to
one prosecutorial route. He argued that the government could only pros-
ecute copyright infringement under the code sections which expressly ad-
dress criminal copyright infringement, namely section 506 of Title 17 and
section 2319 of Title 18.24 According to Dowling, the mail fraud statute,
section 3141 of Title 18, did not apply to copyright infringement as Con-
gress had expressly addressed criminal copyright infringement in sections
18. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 210-11.
19. Dowling, 739 F.2d at 1446.
20. Id. at 1446-47.
21. Id. at 1447.
22. Dowling, 739 F.2d at 1451.
23. 715 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
24. See supra note 8 and accompanying text regarding the Piracy and Counterfeiting
Amendments Act of 1982.
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506 and 2319.25 The Ninth Circuit found that argument to be without
merit, referring to its treatment in Belmont of the "exclusive
prosecutorial route" argument in defense to a NSPA section 2314 count
against defendant Belmont.26
In Belmont, the court addressed whether NSPA section 2314 ap-
plied to copyright infringement although Congress had expressly ad-
dressed criminal copyright infringement in sections 506 and 2319.27 The
Belmont court rejected the contention that Congress intended to limit the
prosecution of copyright infringing acts to the express provisions of sec-
tions 506 and 2319.2' The court reasoned that because section 2319 pro-
vided that its "penalties shall be in addition to any other provision of
Title 17 and any other law," sections 506 and 2319 were not the only
criminal provisions under which criminal copyright defendants could be
prosecuted.29 The Dowling court, finding merit in the "any other law"
reasoning of Belmont, stated that Dowling had presented no evidence
that Congress intended sections 506 and 2319 to be "the exclusive
prosecutorial route with which to punish individuals who infringe copy-
rights"; accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found nothing in the Copyright
Act to prohibit prosecution of Dowling under the mail fraud statute.30
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Dowling's second argument-his
defense against the NSPA section 2314 count.31 Dowling argued that the
bootleg phonorecords he had transported interstate were not "stolen
goods" within the meaning of NSPA section 2314.32 The Ninth Circuit
did not analyze whether the phonorecords were "stolen goods." Instead,
it relied on a broad concept it had previously expressed in Belmont: that
the rights of copyright owners are just as deserving of protection under
the NSPA as the rights of owners of other types of property.33 In Bel-
mont, the court had reasoned that "[w]hen society creates new kinds of
property and thieves devise new ways of appropriating that property to
their own use, the law against transporting property expands with the
growth in the varieties of property., 34 On that reasoning, the Ninth Cir-
25. Dowling, 739 F.2d at 1448.
26. Id. (citing Belmont, 715 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983)).
27. Belmont, 715 F.2d at 462.
28. Id.
29. Id.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). See supra note 12 re-
garding the "any other law" provision.
30. Dowling, 739 F.2d at 1448.
31. Id. 1450-51.
32. Id. 1450.
33. Id. (citing Belmont, 715 F.2d at 462).
34. Belmont, 715 F.2d at 462. It should be noted that copyright and copyright infringe-
ment existed before the law against interstate transportation was enacted; thus copyrights are
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cuit affirmed Dowling's convictions under NSPA section 2314 for inter-
state transportation of stolen goods. a5
THE SUPREME COURT REVERSAL: THE COMMON SENSE MEANING
OF NSPA SECTION 2314 REQUIRES BOTH PHYSICAL TAKING AND
PHYSICAL IDENTITY BETWEEN THE GOODS STOLEN AND THOSE
TRANSPORTED; THEREFORE, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE
NOT PROTECTED
As its premise, the Supreme Court stated the principle that ambigui-
ties in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity; that is, the
principle that criminal statutes should be construed narrowly.36 The
Court then examined whether copyright infringement can be the under-
lying offense for NSPA section 2314. Dowling, according to the Court,
did not contest the goods element or the $5,000 valuation element con-
tained in section 2314.a1 Dowling admitted that the phonorecords he
transported were "goods" of a value of $5,000 or more, but contested
whether the goods were "stolen, converted or taken by fraud," under
NSPA section 2314.38 The government argued that the phonorecords
were stolen under NSPA section 2314 because they physically embodied
copyrighted expressions which Dowling had no right to distribute; there-
fore, the unauthorized use of copyrighted expressions was stealing under
the statute.39 The government also noted that the source material from
which the Elvis phonorecords were reproduced was obtained through il-
licit means and so stolen, and that as the phonorecords were "the same"
not "new" kinds of property and copyright infringement is not a "new" way of appropriating
property as regards interstate transportation.
35. Dowling, 739 F.2d at 1451.
36. Dowling 473 U.S. at 213-14. That principle is, however, only a generality and general-
ities about statutory construction are of little help in resolving the "special difficulties" encoun-
tered when construing a particular statute. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221 (1952). Indeed, reference to the principle of narrow construction often merely
indicates the court's view as to whether a statute is ambiguous or clear in the first place. For
example, in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), Justice Blackmun joined the dissent
that took the view that the criminal statute at issue was clear and should be read broadly. In
Dowling, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, taking the view that the criminal stat-
ute at issue was ambiguous and should be read narrowly. Compare Bass, 404 U.S. at 347-48
and Bass, 404 U.S. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) with Dowling, 473 U.S. at 215-16 and
Dowling, 473 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 214. See supra note 10 regarding the NSPA § 2314 elements.
38. Id. In effect, however, Dowling did contest the goods element because an argument
that the phonorecords were not stolen is an argument that copyrighted expressions are not the
sort of good which can be the subject of theft. Dowling admitted that the physical pho-
norecords were goods, but not that copyrighted expressions are goods.
39. Id.
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as the source material, the phonorecords also were stolen.4' The Court
declined to consider the "illicit means" argument.41
Stating that "interference with copyright does not easily equate with
theft,"42 the Court held that interstate distribution of copyright infring-
ing materials was not interstate transportation of stolen goods under
NSPA section 2314, when that section is narrowly construed.43 To sup-
port its conclusion, the Court stated that cases prosecuted under NSPA
section 2314 have "always" involved physical goods that have themselves
been stolen," even though some section 2314 cases have involved goods
which derived their value from an intangible component or goods which
have been physically altered by the defendants.45 The Court declared
that in order to comport with the "common sense" meaning of the stat-
ute, there must be: (i) a prior physical taking of the subject goods; and
(ii) a physical identity between the goods stolen and those eventually
transported.46
In rejecting the government's position that copyright infringement is
equivalent to theft, conversion or fraud, the Court made two points about
the nature of a copyright: (i) that the copyright owner "holds no ordi-
nary chattel," as the copyright statute confers only a bundle of carefully
defined rights; and (ii) that the copyright owner does not have complete
control over the work as some use by others is permitted under the doc-
trine of fair use.4 7 According to the Court, because the copyright
owner's rights are subject to defined limits, copyrights are distinct from
the possessory interests of the owner of simple goods.4' The Court rea-
soned that because copyright infringers do not assume physical control of
the copyright and do not wholly deprive the owner of use of the work,
40. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 215 n.7.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 217-18.
43. Id. at 217-18, 229.
44. Id. at 216.
45. Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 956 (1978); United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959); and United States v.
Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973)).
46. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216. See infra notes 67, 81 and 88 and accompanying text.
47. Id. at 216-17. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
and Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). Fair use is a limitation on the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder which makes non-infringing the use of a copyrighted
work without license "for such purposes as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...
scholarship or research ...." Factors to be considered regarding whether a use is a fair use
are the commercial nature of the use, the amount and substantiality of the portion used and
the effect of the use on the potential market. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(l)(3)(4) (West 1977). See
infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
48. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217.
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copyright infringement "fits but awkwardly" with the language of NSPA
section 2314.19
Noting that the Presley copyrights were clearly infringed by Dow-
ling, the Court commented that "[i]t is less clear.., that the taking that
occurs when an infringer arrogates the use of another's protected work
comfortably fits the terms associated with physical removal employed by
section 2314."- o Then referring to the principle of narrow construction
of criminal statutes, the Court confessed that it was "reluctant" to make
an expansive reading of the NSPA.51
The Dowling Court found additional support for its holding in both
the history of criminal copyright provisions and the broad consequences
of the government's theory. The Court reviewed the history of criminal
copyright provisions, including the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amend-
ments Act of 1982,52 and reasoned that the careful approach of Congress
in providing criminal penalties for copyright infringement indicates that
Congress did not intend to reach copyright infringement with NSPA sec-
tion 2314. 3 The Court stated that the availability of a prison sentence of
ten years on the basis of interstate transportation (which is not otherwise
relevant to copyright infringement) "convince[d]" the Court that Con-
gress did not intend NSPA section 2314 to apply in copyright cases.5 4
In reviewing the broad consequences of the government's theory,
the Court considered the effect of applying NSPA section 2314 penalties
in copyright infringement cases such as Harper & Row, Publishers v. Na-
tion Enterprises ("Harper & Row").5" In Harper & Row, the Court held
that The Nation magazine had infringed the copyright in former Presi-
dent Ford's memoirs when The Nation published excerpts of Ford's
memoirs prior to publication by Harper & Row of the entire book.56 The
prosecutors in Dowling conceded at oral argument that the section 2314
theory they advocated would permit prosecution of infringers such as
The Nation for interstate transportation of stolen goods.5 7 The Court
thought that the possibility of such outlandish prosecution indicated that
NSPA section 2314 should not apply in copyright infringement cases. 58
49. Id. at 217-18. See infra notes 65 and 91 regarding deprivation.
50. Id. at 217.
51. Id. at 218.
52. See supra note 8 regarding the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982.
53. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 221-26.
54. Id. at 225-26.
55. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
56. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 226.
57. Id.
58. Id.
1987]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7
The Court also noted that another consequence of the prosecution's the-
ory could be prosecution under NSPA section 2314 for interstate trans-
portation of patent infringing materials, although Congress has never
provided criminal penalties for the distribution of patent infringing
materials.
59
ANALYSIS: THE PRIOR LAW AND THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court decision in Dowling goes against the decisions of
five of the six circuits that have addressed the applicability of NSPA sec-
tion 2314 to copyright infringement cases.' Although the Supreme
59. Id. at 226-27.
60. The following circuits have addressed the applicability of NSPA § 2314 to copyright
infringement cases and decided that copyright infringing materials were stolen goods under
that section. The Second Circuit in three district court opinions: United States v. Sam Goody,
Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (unauthorized duplication of sound recordings);
United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (wholesale distribution of bootleg
musical recordings); and United States v. Steerwell Leisure Corp., 598 F. Supp. 171
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (distribution of video games). The Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1980) (manufacture and vending of eight-track tapes). The
Ninth Circuit in five appellate opinions: United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978) (unauthorized sale of copies of films, copies indirectly
proven to be stolen); United States v. Atheron, 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (unauthorized sale
of copies of films); United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1022 (1984) (sale of copies of films taped off the air, no taking of a physical good); United
States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (Minor was one of Dowling's codefendants); and
United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). The Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (unauthorized duplica-
tion and distribution of videotapes, no physical good taken) and United States v. Drum, 733
F.2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1984) (unauthorized duplication of legitimately acquired phonorecords,
no physical good taken). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707 (D.D.C. 1978) (unauthorized duplication and distribu-
tion of sound recordings).
The only circuit which held that NSPA § 2314 did not include criminal copyright as an
underlying offense was the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1982). The Smith court commented that stealing is an offense against possessory interests and
that taping of copyrighted works off the air "does not implicate a tangible item"; it distin-
guished Drebin where original works were stolen and used to make copies. Id. at 243-44 and
n.17.
In addition to the § 2314 copyright cases sucessfully prosecuted before Dowling, in several
cases before Dowling courts found that § 2314 applied in theft of trade secrets, as misappropri-
ated trade secrets were stolen goods. See Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956)
(photocopy of geophysical map on complaining witness's paper was a stolen good, but trans-
portation element not shown); United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959) (photo-
copy of geophysical maps on complaining witness's paper were stolen goods); United States v.
Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960) (same); American Cyanamid Co. v. Sharff, 309 F.2d 790
(3d Cir. 1962) (trade secrets, strains of microorganisms and sample drugs were stolen goods);
United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966) (microorganisms and instructions for
drug manufacture were stolen goods; where physical documents were taken from complaining
witnesses' offices, handcopied and photocopied and returned to office, only copies moved in
1987] CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Court is clearly not bound by the decisions of the lower courts, the lean-
ing of the prior authority draws the Court's reasoning into question. Be-
yond nose counting- analysis of the prior law and the Court's reasoning
demonstrates that the Dowling decision was poorly researched and
reasoned.
A. The Prior Law: The test for "stolen good" and the requirement of
minimum physicality
1. The test for "stolen good"
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit reviewed the prior
law to determine how the terms "goods" and "stolen" had been defined.
The prior law defined "goods" as that which is the subject of commerce
6
1
and "stealing" as the deprivation of rights and benefits of ownership.62
interstate commerce); United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973) (original phys-
ical documents taken).
61. The Third Circuit in Seagraves, stated that "[tihe terms 'goods, wares, merchandise' is
[sic] a general and comprehensive designation of such personal property or chattels as are
ordinarily a subject of commerce." 265 F.2d at 880 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 823
(4th ed. 1951)). The Seagraves court found that geophysical maps were goods as they were
frequently sold. Id. Accord, American Cyanamid, 309 F.2d at 796. In Greenwald, the Sixth
Circuit found that the existence of an established market for chemical formulas rendered those
formulas goods under the NSPA. 479 F.2d at 322 (citing Seagraves, 265 F.2d at 880). In Sam
Goody, the Eastern District of New York commented that "[o]n their face, the words 'goods,
wares, merchandise' appear to have been intended to extend broadly to all types of property
likely to move in commerce, with no distinction between items of a completely tangible charac-
ter and items of a mixed tangible-intangible character. .... Judicial construction of § 2314 has
consistently focused primarily on the commercial nature of the items involved .... " 506 F.
Supp. at 388. In the case of In re Vericker, the court held that stolen FBI documents were not
goods under § 2314 because FBI documents are not ordinarily bought and sold in commerce.
446 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1971).
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit held that in order for an item to fall within the "goods, wares
or merchandise" language, the item must have some sort of tangible existence; the court stated
that although copyrights are commonly bought and sold, they are not in the nature of personal
property. 686 F.2d at 241.
62. The Second Circuit in United States v. Handler, 142 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1944), reviewed
the legislative history of the NSPA and stated "[w]e think it is clear that the [NSPA] was not
restricted to the transportation of property taken larcenously.... In our opinion the statute is
applicable to any taking whereby a person dishonestly obtains goods or securities belonging to
another with the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership." Han-
dler, 142 F.2d at 353. In United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957), the majority of the
Supreme Court stated that the term "stolen" in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act
("NMVTA"), predecessor to the NSPA, was not limited to common law larceny; "theft" be-
ing a broader term than larceny and including "all cases of depriving another of his property,
... larceny, robbery, cheating, embezzlement, breach of trust, etc." Turley, 352 U.S. at 412-
14. In United States v. Plott, 345 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), stealing was defined as "any
dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains what rightfully belongs to another, and de-
prives the owner of the rights, and benefits of ownership." Plott, 345 F. Supp. at 1231 (citing
Handler, 142 F.2d at 353, and finding that the State of Georgia was the owner in trust of wild
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Thus the prior law set up a commerce-deprivation test.
Applying the commerce-deprivation test to the facts of the Dowling
case, it is apparent that the phonorecords distributed nationwide by
Dowling were not only criminal copyright infringements, but also were
stolen goods under NSPA section 2314 as it had previously been con-
strued. Selling Elvis without a license and without paying copyright roy-
alties did "deprive" the Elvis copyright holders of the rights and benefits
of their ownership of songs, which were "the usual subject of com-
merce." Had Dowling wanted to use the Elvis material without infring-
ing, he could have negotiated with the Elvis copyright holders for a
mechanical license, or if the copyright holders had already granted a
mechanical license, he could have availed himself of the compulsory li-
cense provisions found in the copyright statute and simply paid the statu-
tory royalties.63 Had Dowling paid a fee, he would not have deprived the
alligators in the state which the defendant, through poaching and transporting out of state, had
stolen under the NSPA).
Conversion under § 2314, as well as stealing, has been broadly defined. The Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Drum, held that "copyrights, once given tangible form, may be
'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' and fall within the reach of section 2314." Drum, 753
F.2d at 1506 (citing United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 271-72 (1952) where conversion
was defined as "use in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property
placed in one's custody for a limited use").
In Smith, however, the Fifth Circuit held that copyright infringement is not the
equivalent of stealing, converting or taking by fraud because stealing contemplates the removal
or moving of something tangible. Smith, 686 F.2d at 241-42. The Smith analysis was criti-
cized in Gallant, 570 F. Supp. at 312-14. The Gallant court commented that the Smith hold-
ing was counter to a "long history and ... wide acceptartce of a broad definition for the terms
'stolen' and 'converted' " as those terms were "clearly intended to offer a range of partly over-
lapping terms in order to cover illegal acquistions and uses comprehensively," and the court
declined to narrow the traditional reach of § 2314. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. at 313-14.
In contexts other than § 2314, copyrights have been considered both capable of conver-
sion and not capable of conversion. See A & M Records v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 570,
142 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1977) (copyrights converted); Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp.,
114 P.2d 370, 45 Cal. App. 2d 464 (1941) (copyrights not capable of conversion); Local
Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 179 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1948) (copyright infringement is not a con-
version action for purposes of applicable statute of limitations). According to Prosser, in-
tangibles are not the proper subject of conversion actions. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 90-
92 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser outlines the history of what property could be the subject of an
action for conversion. The original rule was that only tangible items capable of being lost and
found could be converted. Later, conversion actions were allowed regarding documents in
which intangible rights were merged so that one became the symbol of the other, such as a
check or stock certificate. Prosser comments that "[t]here is perhaps no very valid and essen-
tial reason why there might not be conversion... [of intangibles such as goodwill or ideas] or
.any species of personal property which is subject to private ownership' "; but he suggests that
remedies other than conversion, such as unfair competition torts, should be fashioned to pro-
tect the owners of intangibles. Id.
63. The Copyright Act provides a compulsory license for making and distributing pho-
norecords. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West 1986).
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Elvis copyright holders of their rights to songs which were the usual sub-
ject of commerce.
The Dowling majority commented that infringers do not wholly de-
prive copyright holders of the use of their work, and that some fair use
by others is allowed." Yet as protested by the Dowling dissent, Dowling
exercised the very rights that copyright law granted to the Elvis copy-
right holders: the right to publish, copy and distribute the work.65 Fur-
ther, Dowling's use was not a fair use: rather it was a commercial use of a
substantial portion of the work, with a significant damaging effect on the
potential market.66
The commerce-deprivation test for stolen goods, set forth in the
prior definitions of "goods" and "stolen," is a better test than the com-
plete physicality test devised by the Court in Dowling. The complete
physicality test requires both a physical taking and physical identity be-
tween the goods stolen and those transported across state lines.67 Thus,
the complete physicality test emphasizes Dowling's ownership of the
vinyl part of the phonorecords and ignores the fact that the vinyl moved
in commerce only because of the copyrighted expressions, owned by the
Elvis copyright holders, that were embodied on the vinyl.6" While the
complete physicality test emphasizes what is insignificant in commerce,
the commerce-deprivation test emphasizes what is significant in com-
merce, the song which was bought and sold.
Had the Dowling Court used the commerce-deprivation test for sto-
len goods, and accordingly found the Dowling phonorecords to be stolen
64. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216-17.
65. See supra note 47 regarding fair use. Additionally, complete deprivation is not re-
quired for a § 2314 violation. Schwab v. United States, 327 F.2d 11, 13 (8th Cir. 1964). See
notes 49 and 91 and accompanying text regarding deprivation.
66. See supra note 47 regarding the factors to consider when determining if a use is a fair
use.
67. See notes 46, 67, 81 and 88 regarding the complete physicality test.
68. In United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966), one of the many geophysical
map-trade secret cases, the defendant argued that in many instances the original map was not
taken, rather a photocopy was taken, so the maps taken were not stolen property. The Third
Circuit noted that the paper was not the object of the theft, the information contained in it
was; the court answered the defendant's argument with a statement in his own brief:
But no one would suppose that, because a business man would be willing to pay a
large sum of money to his competitor's employee to give him a piece of paper on
which such a secret was written, the piece of paper had a market value. It is the idea,
not its material paper embodiment, which is valuable.
Lester, 282 F.2d at 755.
Likewise, no one would suppose that the vinyl part of a phonorecord is the object of
public purchasing or the object of a pirate's theft. Therefore, the Dowling complete physicality
test focused on the insignificant: the song is the object of the theft, not the physical vinyl. It is
immaterial that the vinyl belonged to Dowling.
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goods, the economic philosophy behind copyright law would have been
furthered, as copyrighted expressions would have been recognized as ob-
jects of commerce. The goals of criminal law also would have been fur-
thered as those persons who deprive others of ownership rights, whether
of tangible or intangible items, would have been subject to prosecution.
2. The requirement of minimum physicality
In its opinion, the Court stated that NSPA section 2314 cases have
"always" involved physical goods which have themselves been stolen,
even though some section 2314 cases have involved goods which derived
their value from an intangible component, or goods which have been
physically altered.69 Contrary to the Court's statement, many section
2314 cases have involved copyright infringement or theft of trade secrets;
in such cases, often no physical good was itself stolen; and if a physical
good was stolen, it was often a commercially insignificant good, such as
the complaining witness's paper, which happened to embody commer-
cially significant trade secrets.70
The prior law did not require that a physical good be itself stolen.
All that was required was "minimum physicality." The first statement of
the minimum physicality requirement is in United States v. Bottone.7' In
Bottone, the defendant took documents containing instructions for drug
manufacture from the files of Lederle Laboratories, the complaining wit-
ness. The defendant made photocopies and handwritten notes of the in-
structions and returned the original documents to the Lederle files. No
physical materials belonging to Lederle Laboratories moved in interstate
commerce. Although in Bottone physical goods were themselves taken
(and then returned so that only duplicates moved in interstate com-
merce), the Bottone court in dicta discussed the question whether physi-
cal goods must themselves be taken. The Bottone court reasoned that
only minimum physicality should be required, stating that NSPA section
2314 would not apply when intangibles are memorized and carried
across state lines in a defendant's head, but would apply when the de-
fendant makes an intermediate transcription onto any tangible object
that is taken, even a tangible object owned by the defendant.7 2 The dicta
in Bottone set up a "minimum physicality" requirement because the Bot-
tone court thought that only movement of any tangible object should be
required, not stealing of a tangible object belonging to the complaining
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 60 for a listing of the prior cases.
71. 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966).
72. Id. at 393-94.
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witness. The Bottone minimum physicality dicta has been relied on by
several courts as authority for the proposition that "no theft of the origi-
nal tangible medium need occur at all; only the intangible component
need be taken, and once it is transferred to a physical medium, albeit one
legitimately owned by the taker, it [comes] within the meaning of
§ 2314."
73
Copyrighted materials will always meet the minimum physicality re-
quirement. Copyrighted expressions, although intangible in themselves,
are necessarily "fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which
they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated. '74 The
copyright statute requires tangible fixation for copyrights to exist,75 and
the public obviously requires tangible fixation prior to its purchase of
music.7 6 Several courts have noted the tangible-intangible nature of
copyrighted materials, and stated that as intangible copyrighted expres-
sions are made effectively tangible by their embodiment upon tape or
film, NSPA section 2314 may be applied in copyright infringement
cases. 
77
Underneath the Courts opinion runs a questioning stream: should
we punish music pirates when what they take is intangible?... intangible
copyrights cannot be seen, touched or carried... how can we call some-
thing a stolen good if the alleged thief never laid eyes or hands on it... ?
Unfortunately, the Court never confronted the fact that although we can-
not see, touch or carry copyrighted expressions, we can perceive them.
The buying public obviously perceives the music it purchases. Courts
regularly test for civil and criminal copyright infringement by testing our
73. Sam Goody, 506 F. Supp. at 389. For further discussion of the Bottone minimum
physicality requirement, Gallant, 570 F. Supp. at 312 and Drebin, 557 F.2d at 1332. In intel-
lectual property-NSPA § 2314 cases, most courts assumed that duplicates could be stolen
goods under NSPA § 2314 in accordance with the minimum physicality requirement; the fact
that the physical embodiment, whether vinyl, magnetic tape, film or paper, belonged to the
defendant did not take the defendant's activities out of the statute.
74. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1977). Letter Edged in Black Press v. Public Bldg.
Comm'n., 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (N.D. 111. 1970) (copyright can exist only in a perceptible,
tangible work; it cannot exist in a vision).
75. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1977).
76. The public wants the right music fixed on the tangible medium of a phonorecord, so
the music can be repeatedly played: but the public generally does not care who owned the
tangible medium when the music was affixed.
77. Gottesman, 724 F.2d at 1520 (embodiment on tapes makes the copyrighted work a
good within § 2314); Drum, 733 F.2d at 1505; Atherton, 561 F.2d at 752 (embodiment on film
makes the copyrighted work sufficiently reified to be a good within § 2314); Sam Goody, 506
F. Supp. at 389.
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common perception of substantial similarity between works.78 Dowling
clearly knew what he wanted to take and sell.
All music piracy can be perceived: the minimum physicality require-
ment79 coupled with the tangible-intangible nature of all copyrighted
materials8" provide that all music piracy can be perceived. Those two
requirements, already firmly rooted in the law, render copyrights suffi-
ciently perceivable to be protected by the law of stolen property.
Although music pirates never lay eyes or hands on copyrights, their
piracy is very real, can be perceived and should be prosecuted. There is
no reason why the courts cannot test for a perceivable interstate trans-
portation of copyright infringing materials.
The prior law of "minimum physicality" makes more sense than the
complete physicality test devised by the Court.8" The minimum physi-
cality requirement allows the commerce-deprivation test 82 to emphasize
what is economically valuable, the intangible songs, and only requires
that they be embodied in any tangible medium from which they can be
perceived. The complete physicality test emphasizes what the Court
called the "common sense meaning of the statutory language,"83 but
what the Court called "common sense" is really cartoon sense: a thief is
a masked man climbing out of a window, carrying a t.v. set.
84
The Court's complete physicality test turns on an insignificant fact:
who owns an insignificant tangible object, which embodies a valuable in-
tangible. Under the complete physicality test in the trade secret sphere,
the clever thief who brings his own paper for the photocopy machine is
not culpable and the thief who uses the photocopy paper belonging to the
complaining witness is culpable. Under the complete physicality test in
the music sphere, the defendant who buys source material, such as a
vinyl phonorecord, makes duplicates on his own physical objects, such as
cassette tapes, and then distributes the duplicates nationwide without
paying royalties, has not violated NSPA section 2314 because he owns
both the vinyl and the tapes.85 The thief who, as Dowling, steals his
78. See infra note 96 regarding the perception of theft of copyrights as tested by the ele-
ments of copyright infringement including the substantial similarity and copying requirements.
79. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
81. See notes 46, 67 and 88 and accompanying text. The complete physicality test devised
by the Court is analyzed below in the section headed "The Court's Reasoning."
82. The commerce-deprivation test found in the prior law is explained in the section
headed "the test for 'stolen good.'" See supra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text.
83. Dowling, 473 U.S. 216.
84. The most sensible meaning of stolen goods is found in the commerce-deprivation test:
stolen goods are those objects of commerce of which the owner has been deprived.
85. The defendant who buys a phonorecord, makes duplicates on stolen blank tapes, and
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source material, makes duplicates on his own physical object and sells
the duplicates across country also has not violated NSPA section 2314
because he owns the vinyl.8 6 Only the defendant who steals many pho-
norecords and transports them across country (without duplication) has
violated NSPA section 2314 under the Dowling complete physicality test.
On analysis, the Court's questions regarding theft of intangibles, re-
late to enforceability and evidentiary concerns, not to whether a theft has
occurred. The minimum physicality requirement found in the prior law
should have allayed the enforceability and evidentiary concerns which
would reasonably arise were no physical object required. The man
whistling along with the radio while he drives across country will not be
prosecuted for interstate transportation of stolen goods because under a
rule of "minimum physicality," some physical object is required. De-
fendants such as Dowling, however, who ship pirated phonorecords
across state lines, will be prosecuted as their theft is perceivable albeit the
theft of an intangible.8 7 The Bottone minimum physicality requirement
allays enforceability or evidenciary concerns, yet punishes music pirates
who victimize copyright holders and the society which set up copyrights
to economically promote the arts.
B. The Court's Reasoning: The requirement of physical taking and the
requirement of physical identity
The Court devised a complete physicality test, requiring (i) a prior
physical taking of the subject goods, and (ii) a physical identity between
sells the duplicates without paying royalties, has supposedly only deprived the blank tape
store, not the copyright holder. Likewise, the defendant who steals a phonorecord and makes
duplicates on stolen blank tapes, and sells the duplicates without paying royalties, has suppos-
edly only deprived the phonorecord store and the blank tape store, not the copyright holder.
Of course, if a defendant stole many phonorecords and then transported them without duplica-
tion, copyright issues would not be implicated and the phonorecords would simply be stolen
goods.
If a defendant bought many phonorecords and transported them for sale without duplica-
tion, that distribution would not be an infringement under the first sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 109 (West 1986). The first sale doctrine makes noninfringing the sale of particular copies
owned (as opposed to duplicates). It does not make noninfringing distribution of pho-
norecords "by rental, lease or lending," but those who infringe by rental, lease or lending of
particular copies of phonorecords owned are not subject to criminal penalties. Id. See also
note 104 regarding first sale as a defense to copyright-NSPA § 2314 charges.
86. Under Dowling, the thief who steals a phonorecord and makes duplicates on his own
tape and sells them could be culpable if the right arguments were made. The Court declined to
consider the argument that if the source material was obtained by illict means and duplicates
were made, the duplicates would be "the same" and so also stolen goods. See supra note 41
and accompanying text.
87. See infra note 96 regarding the perception of theft of copyrights as tested by the ele-
ments of copyright infringement including the substantial similarity and copying requirements.
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the goods stolen and those eventually transported."8 As will be demon-
strated below, criminal copyright infringement involves both a physical
taking, through mechanical reproduction, and a perceivable identity be-
tween what is stolen and what is transported. Thus criminal copyright
infringement either sufficiently meets the complete physicality test or the
test asks too much.
1. The requirement of physical taking
The requirement of physical taking asks too much because the phys-
ical reproduction which occurs in music piracy should be a sufficient tak-
ing for NSPA section 2314 to apply. Common sense should have told
the Court that duplication of copyrighted expressions necessarily in-
volves a physical taking of the subject goods through mechanical repro-
duction. In order for phonorecords to be pressed or photocopies to be
made (or films to be videotaped or cassette tapes to be duplicated), a
physical taking of the copyrighted expressions occurs. For example, as
regards cassette tapes, magnetic impulses or recorded sounds,89 the copy-
righted expressions are physically taken from one tape and set down on
another.9° In Dowling, the defendants had phonorecords physically man-
ufactured, taking the copyrighted expressions (the subject good) from
source material without authorization from the Elvis copyright holders,
and setting those expressions down on their own vinyl. The Court appar-
ently thought that the physical reproduction that occurs in music piracy
was insufficient to be a theft, as a copy is left behind and the copyright
owners still have a copy.91 Obviously, there is no complete physical tak-
ing when copies are left behind.
But should complete physical taking be required? The government
argued that the new copy was "the same" as the source copy, and that
since the source copy was stolen, the duplicate phonorecords were also
88. See notes 46, 67 and 81 and accompanying text.
89. The Seventh Circuit in Berkwitt instructed the jury that what was stolen was the fixa-
tion of recorded sounds, not the tangible component parts of the tapes. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d at
658.
90. See Berkwitt, 619 F.2d at 652, where the defendants' physical manufacturing business
is described. The defendants kept an apartment specifically for the purpose of eight-track tape
manufacture. They had "an Ampex master-maker, a Liberty duplicator with three slave dupli-
cators, one winder, a degausser, a delineator, masters, pancakes, eight-track cartridge compo-
nents, stereo components, phonographic records (and] a stopwatch" for the physical taking of
magnetic impulses or recorded sounds from legitimate phonorecords and setting them down
on illegitimate duplicate eight-track tapes.
91. See supra notes 49 and 65 and accompanying text regarding physical control of the
copyrighted work and complete deprivation of the copyright holder.
[Vol. 7
CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
stolen.92 The government's argument left open the door for a defendant
to buy the source material, duplicate it and distribute it across state lines
without triggering section 2314. 9  Nevertheless, the idea that the new
copy is "the same" as the source material is compelling. Under a test of
"good" as that which is the subject of commerce, the new copy is the
same good as the source material as it has the same value and identity in
commerce. An audience would enjoy the new copy in the same way as
the source material and so would pay the same price. Regardless of what
is left behind, the physical takings of music piracy take something eco-
nomically valuable. Requiring complete physical taking is unreasonable
as physical reproduction alone is enough to be economic deprivation or
theft.
Requiring physical reproduction to trigger NSPA section 2314
would better serve the goals of copyright and criminal laws than requir-
ing complete physical taking. Physical reproduction alone causes eco-
nomic deprivation to the copyright holder and economic gain to the
music pirate. Requiring complete physical taking ignores the real eco-
nomic injury caused by the "mere" physical reproduction of music
piracy. Perhaps when the Court required complete physical taking it was
thinking that without a guilty hand, there cannot be a guilty mind. Yet a
common sense look at what music pirates do reveals that they use their
hands to physically reproduce music not their own. Thus, physical re-
production should be enough for NSPA section 2314 to apply.
2. The requirement of physical identity
The requirement of complete physical identity asks too much as the
perceivable identity between the music stolen and the music eventually
transported should be sufficient for NSPA section 2314 to apply. The
Court required complete physical identity: transportation of the same
physical object across states lines, not transportation of the same copy-
righted expressions reproduced in another physical object.94 Obviously,
duplicate phonorecords are not the same physical object as the source
material from which they were reproduced. Thus copyright-infringing
materials when transported across state lines do not meet a complete, or
even partial," physical identity requirement.
92. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 85 and 86 and accompanying text.
94. The court in Gallant commented that "nearly every court considering an indictment
under § 2314 has not read the words 'the same' [from the statute] to require literally that what
is transported be in exactly the same form as what was stolen." See Gallant, 570 F. Supp. at
311 n.10 and cases cited therein.
95. The Dowling Court noted that goods which have been altered do come within NSPA
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But should physical identity be required? Already built into the
copyright law is a test of perceivable identity. In order to prove copy-
right infringement, substantial similarity must be proved.9 6 The require-
ment of complete physical identity belies common sense of the
marketplace, where unauthorized duplicate phonorecords are bought,
sold and enjoyed in the same way as authorized phonorecords. As stated
above in the discussion of physical taking, the unauthorized copy has the
same value and identity in commerce from the audience's perspective.
Requiring perceivable identity, rather than physical identity, to trig-
ger NSPA section 2314, would better serve the goals of copyright and
criminal laws. The requirement of physical identity turns on whether a
good is tangible or intangible, not on whether the owner of a good, which
is the usual subject of commerce, is being deprived of the rights and bene-
fits of that ownership. Requiring physical identity is just another way of
saying it is less evil to steal an intangible song than it is to steal a tangible
car.9 7 The physical identity requirement does not serve the goals of the
copyright and criminal laws at issue, as those laws were meant to en-
courage music creation and to prevent deprivation of commerical rights.
Requiring perceivable identity, on the other hand, would make it a public
offense to duplicate someone else's music, and sell it to audiences who
perceive pirated music in the same way as authorized music. The per-
ceivable identity requirement turns on deprivation of commercial rights,
and so should be enough for NSPA section 2314 to apply.
CONCLUSION: DUE PROCESS CONCERNS AND A CALL FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Applying NSPA section 2314 to copyright infringement gives rise to
serious due process concerns.98 Music pirates may know that what they
do involves criminal penalties, but they probably do not have adequate
notice of the potential prosecution for interstate transportation under the
NSPA and the penalties available thereunder. 99
§ 2314. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216 (citing United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978) (altered concert tickets)).
96. To establish a claim of copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) ownership of the copyright in the complaining work;
(2) originality of the work;
(3) copying of the work by the defendant; and
(4) a substantial degree of similarity between the two works.
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984).
97. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
98. See generally Note, Copyrights and the National Stolen Property Act: Is the Copyright
Infringer a Thief? 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 1242, 1255 (1984).
99. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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Holding the serious due process concerns aside for a moment, it is
clear that applying NSPA section 2314 to copyright infringement does
not give rise to the outlandish possibility that innocent, or even merely
willful infringers will be prosecuted for interstate transportation of stolen
goods. The prosecution was wrong when it conceded at oral argument
that The Nation could be prosecuted under NSPA section 2314 for its
scoop publication of President Ford's memoirs."o The Nation was held a
civil infringer, but there was a significant fair use issue. 0 1 In order to
have sucessfully prosecuted The Nation under NSPA section 2314, the
government would have had a difficult burden of proof: the government
would have to have proved not only all the elements of civil copyright
infringement, 10 2 but also several layers of willfullness and knowledge in
order to prove the mens rea elements of both criminal copyright infringe-
ment and interstate transportation.0 3 The Nation lost on its fair use de-
fense, but it probably would have succeeded in a defense to a criminal
copyright infringement: its infringement probably would not have been
found willful beyond a reasonable doubt as there was a significant fair use
issue. The Nation also probably would have succeeded in a defense to
interstate transportation, as genuine belief in consent from the copyright
holder is a defense," ° and a copyright holder consents to fair use by
statute. Thus, had the Dowling Court held that NSPA section 2314 ap-
100. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
101. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See note 47 for an
explanation of the fair use doctrine.
102. See supra note 96 regarding the elements of civil copyright infringement.
103. The express criminal copyright provision requires willfullness. 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)
(West 1986). A prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, five elements to make out
criminal copyright infringement:
(1) [i]nfringement of copyright;
(2) of a work that has not been the subject of a 'first sale';
(3) done willfully;
(4) with knowledge that the copyrighted work has not been the subject of a "first
sale"; and
(5) for profit.
Atheron, 561 F.2d at 749 (interpreting the Copyright Act of 1909).
A prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, four elements to make out a NSPA
§ 2314 claim:
(1) the existence of unauthorized copies of copyrighted works;
(2) having a value of $5,000 or more;
(3) transported in interstate commerce by the defendants;
(4) with knowledge by the defendants of the "stolen" character (i.e., unauthorized
duplication) of the works.
Sam Goody, 506 F. Supp. at 386.
104. Both the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109, and genuine belief by the defendant that
he has the property owner's consent are defenses to criminal copyright-NSPA § 2314 charges.
United States v. Goss, 803 F.2d 638, 644 (11 th Cir. 1986) (first sale defense). United States v.
Bennett, 665 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra note 85 regarding the first sale doctrine.
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plies to copyright infringing materials, outlandish prosecution would not
have resulted.
Turning back to due process, the lower courts consistently rejected
due process arguments regarding notice of the increased penalties for in-
terstate transportation of copyright infringing materials. 5 Those deci-
sions are questionable given the current attitude concerning music
piracy: that it is not as evil to steal a song as to steal a car. Whether
those decisions on due process were correct is, of course, now a moot
question. As the Dowling rule came down from our highest court, legis-
lative action is necessary if interstate music piracy is ever going to be
subject to penalties on par with other forms of interstate theft. Interstate
music piracy should be subject to stiffer penalties than local music piracy,
just as interstate car theft is subject to stiffer penalties than local car
theft. If Congress did enact legislation placing interstate music piracy on
a par with other forms of interstate theft, then, over time, the existence of
those penalties equating interstate music piracy with interstate car theft
penalties would make it normative for persons in our society to consider
stealing music as evil as stealing cars. If it becomes the norm to view
stealing music as evil as stealing cars, then the due process concerns
about music piracy penalties on par with car theft penalties will disap-
pear; the normative view will serve as notice.
Musicians still get their songs freely from the muse, as Homer did.
But if our society's laws do not punish theft of the muse's expressions
with all the penalties that are available for other forms of theft, then
making music creation one's livelihood will be that much more difficult,
and fewer of us will hear the muse.
Elizabeth Blakey
105. See Gallant, 570 F. Supp. at 311 (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S.
337, 340 (1952)). Gallant argued that the copyright statute does not give notice that infringe-
ment is illegal and that interstate infringement is also illegal. The court held that -[a] person
who has notice that his infringing and distribution activities are illegal has notice that he treads
on dangerous ground." See also Steerwell Leisure, 598 F. Supp. at 173.
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